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NOTE
REDUCING THE UNFAIR EFFECTS OF NONMUTUAL
ISSUE PRECLUSION THROUGH DAMAGES LIMITS
Steven P. Nonkest
INTRODUCTION
More than sixty-five years after Bernhard v. Bank of America Na-
tional Trust & Savings Ass'n, nonmutual issue preclusion is still not
universally accepted. Despite acceptance of the Bernhard doctrine by
federal courts, most state courts, and the drafters of the Restatement
(Second) of Judgments, a sizable number of skeptics are still uncon-
vinced, and serious concerns over the fairness of nonmutuality re-
main. Courts and commentators have advanced various proposals for
limiting the negative effects of nonmutuality while maintaining the
perceived efficiency gains that nonmutual issue preclusion provides.
None of these proposals, however, have been widely accepted. This
Note proposes a method of alleviating the most serious fairness con-
cerns while generally maintaining the benefits of nonmutuality: adop-
tion of per se rules limiting the amount recoverable in damages by a
plaintiff who relies upon offensive nonmutual issue preclusion to es-
tablish an element of the cause of action.
Issue preclusion 2 is a component of res judicata law,3 where-
by any finding by a court4 is binding upon the litigants and their
t B.S., Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, 1997;j.D., Cornell Law School, 2009. Special
thanks go to Professor Kevin Clermont for his invaluable suggestions, to Omari Mason,
Naushin Shibli, Julie Fukes, and Christine Lee for their careful editing, to Sue Pado for
help at a million points along the way, and to Jessica and John and Ellie Nonkes for their
support and for their seemingly infinite patience.
1 122 P.2d 892 (Cal. 1942).
2 Issue preclusion is also correctly referred to as collateral estoppel. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. b (1982). The terms "issue preclusion" and "collateral
estoppel" are used interchangeably herein.
3 Resjudicata law can be generally divided between claim preclusion and issue pre-
clusion. SeeJarosz v. Palmer, 766 N.E.2d 482, 487 (Mass. 2002). Claim preclusion can be
further divided into the doctrines of merger and bar: merger prevents a successful litigant
from pursuing the same claim and receiving duplicate awards; bar prevents an unsuccess-
ful litigant from relitigating the claim. SeeJeanes v. Henderson, 688 S.W.2d 100, 103 (Tex.
1985).
4 Typically, issue preclusion requires that (1) the issues be identical; (2) the issue has
been actually litigated; (3) the issue has been decided; and (4) the issue was necessary to
the priorjudgment. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAw, BUSINESS TORTS AND UNFAIR COM-
PETITION HANDBOOK 367 (2d ed. 2006); see, e.g., Allmerica Fin. Corp. v. Certain Underwrit-
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privies 5 in subsequent litigation. 6 Issue preclusion operates to prevent
relitigation of an issue even if the underlying claim between the par-
ties is different from that in the first suit. 7 It conserves judicial re-
sources by precluding the relitigation of issues that have already been
decided by a court.8 It "is grounded on the premise that once a per-
son has been afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate a particu-
lar issue, that person may not be permitted to do so again."9
Traditionally, issue preclusion requires mutuality-both the party as-
serting issue preclusion and the party against whom issue preclusion is
asserted must have been parties to the prior action. 10 Over time, criti-
cism of the mutuality requirement grew, primarily due to concerns for
efficient use of judicial resources."I Today, many courts have carved
out an exception to the requirement of mutuality whereby one who
was not a party to the prior litigation may rely upon its findings to
bind an opponent who was a party to the prior litigation. 12 Primary
reasons for doing so include judicial efficiency and assurance of con-
sistent results.' 3 Allowing issue preclusion in the absence of mutuality
ers at Lloyd's, London, 871 N.E.2d 418, 433 n.27 (Mass. 2007) ("Collateral estoppel only
applies where an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final
judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment." (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Rille ex rel. Estate of Rille v. Physicians Ins. Co., 728 N.W.2d 693, 702 n.13 (Wis.
2007). The Restatement (Second) of Judgments takes the position that the issue must have
been "actually litigated" and that, to have preclusive effect, findings must have been "essen-
tial to the judgment." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 27 (1982); see Allan D. Ves-
tal, The Restatement (Second) of Judgments: A Modest Dissent, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 464,
466-97 (1981).
5 See Gramatan Home Investors Corp. v. Lopez, 386 N.E.2d 1328, 1332 (N.Y. 1979).
6 See id. at 1331 ("Collateral estoppel, together with its related principles, merger and
bar, is but a component of the broader doctrine of resjudicata which holds that, as to the
parties in a litigation and those in privity with them, ajudgment on the merits by a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the issues of fact and questions of law necessarily
decided therein in any subsequent action.").
7 Jarosz, 766 N.E.2d at 487-88 ("'[T]he determination is conclusive in a subsequent
action between the parties whether on the same or different claim.'" (emphasis added)
(quoting Cousineau v. Laramee, 448 N.E.2d 756, 758 n.4 (Mass. 1983))).
8 See Gramatan Home Investors Corp., 386 N.E.2d at 1331 (noting that issue preclusion
is "so necessary to conserve judicial resources by discouraging redundant litigation").
9 Id.
10 See I A.C. FREEMAN & EDWARD W. TUTTLE, A TREATISE OF THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS
§ 428 (5th ed. 1925) ("No party is, as a general rule, bound in a subsequent proceeding by
ajudgment, unless the adverse party now seeking to secure the benefit of the former adju-
dication would have been prejudiced by it if it had been determined the other way.");
Lewis A. Grossman, The Stoiy of Parklane: The "Litigation Crisis" and the Efficiency Imperative,
in CIVL PROCEDURE STORIES 387, 390-91 (Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2004).
11 See infra Part 11.
12 See infra notes 45, 51, 59, 61 and accompanying text.
13 See Grossman, supra note 10, at 390 ("Legal commentators have traditionally ad-
vanced three main arguments to justify resjudicata: 'First, it protects litigants from harass-
ment through the litigation of the same claim or issue. Second, the principle helps to
preserve the prestige of the courts by avoiding inconsistent judgments .... A third end
served by preclusion . . . is the saving of the courts' time by avoiding repetition of litiga-
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raises serious fairness concerns, however, and it may distort the litiga-
tion process by providing incentives for litigants to overlitigate, lulling
them into underlitigating, or causing them to shift the timing of their
suits. Paradoxically, in multiplaintiff scenarios, it may even result in
an increase in litigation by giving plaintiffs an incentive to avoid join-
der. 14 Commentators have proposed various methods for limiting the
negative consequences of nonmutuality while maintaining the bene-
fits it provides,' 5 and courts have created exceptions to nonmutuality,
generally adopting a flexible approach.1 6 This has led to a considera-
ble degree of uncertainty as to whether nonmutual issue preclusion
will apply in a given case. 17
This Note proposes another method of maintaining the effi-
ciency gains that can result from nonmutual issue preclusion while
limiting the worst of the unfair effects of nonmutuality and giving
greater predictability to whether nonmutual issue preclusion will ap-
ply: limiting the amount of damages that a plaintiff who relies on non-
mutual issue preclusion may recover.
Part I of this Note outlines the traditional requirement of mutual-
ity for issue preclusion. Part II gives an overview of the "modern
trend" away from a requirement of mutuality, i8 and then outlines
some of the principal criticisms of nonmutuality. Part III examines
tion."' (alteration in original) (quoting Allan D. Vestal, ResJudicata/Preclusion by Judgment:
The Law Applied in Federal Courts, 66 MICH. L. REV. 1723, 1723 (1968))); see, e.g., Schwartz v.
Pub. Adm'r, 246 N.E.2d 725, 731 (N.Y. 1969) ("[Ilt is difficult to tolerate a condition
where, on relatively the same set of facts, one fact-finder, . .. may hold the driver liable,
while the other [fact-finder] exonerates him.").
14 Because later plaintiffs would be able to benefit from prior litigation with an earlier
plaintiff without danger of being bound by issues that were decided, "[p]laintiffs who
might otherwise jin together. or intervene, in a single lawsuit under modern permissive
joinder rules would have incentive to sue separately and to hang back awaiting another
plaintiff's favorable result." ROBERT C. CASAD & KEVIN M. CLERMONT, RES JUDiCATA: A
HANDBOOK ON ITS THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE 176 (2001). Not only will this foster
repetitious litigation, but it may also cause suits to be protracted, as plaintiffs may attempt
to delay progress in their own action in hopes that another plaintiff will achieve a favorable
result before their own suit concludes.
15 See infra Part III.B.
16 See CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 14, at 176-79. For example, some courts that
have abandoned mutuality have followed the approach of the Restatement (Second) of Judg-
ments, which states that nonmutual issue preclusion is appropriate "unless [the party to be
precluded] lacked a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the initial action or
unless other special circumstances justify relitigation." Id. at 174 (citing RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 (1982)). The Second Restatement lists some specific circum-
stances in which nonmutuality should not apply, but the list also includes when "[other
compelling circumstances make it appropriate that the party be permitted to relitigate the
issue." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 29(8) (1982).
17 Cf C"SAD & CLERMONT, supra note 14, at 177-79. This uncertainty undermines the
efficiency gains that nonmutual issue preclusion is intended to produce. See infra Part
III.A.3.
18 Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Bailey Lumber Co., 272 S.E.2d 217, 219 (Va. 1980) (refusing to
follow the "modern trend" of abrogating the requirement of mutuality).
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some proposed reforms, short of abrogating nonmutuality, that schol-
ars have put forth to limit the negative effects of nonmutual issue
preclusion.
Part IV examines the potential effects of limits on damages recov-
erable in cases in which a plaintiff relies upon offensive nonmutual
issue preclusion to establish an element of the cause of action. Part IV
analyzes three regimes of damages limits: a fixed cap on the amount
of damages that a plaintiff can recover if the plaintiff relies on non-
mutual issue preclusion to establish an element of the claim; a system
whereby a plaintiff relying on nonmutual issue preclusion cannot re-
cover more in damages than did the plaintiff in the prior case on
which the present plaintiff relies to establish any element of the claim;
and a system whereby damages in any case where the plaintiff relies on
nonmutual issue preclusion to establish any element of the claim are
limited to a fraction of the damages awarded in the prior case on
which the present plaintiff relies for issue preclusion or the most re-
cent preceding case that also relied on the original case as a basis for
issue preclusion.
I
BACKGROUND-TRADITIONAL REQUIREMENT OF MUTUALITY
Traditionally, issue preclusion required mutuality-both the
party asserting issue preclusion and the party against whom issue pre-
clusion was being asserted must have been parties to the prior ac-
tion.19 Additionally, those in privity with the parties could be bound
by any findings necessary to the result.20
Over time, courts developed well-defined exceptions to the re-
quirement of mutuality where the relationship between the prior liti-
gant and the party seeking to use nonmutual issue preclusion would
make it unjust for a court to refuse preclusion. 21 Where multiple par-
ties would be liable for the same act, a judgment that one of those
19 See 1 FREEMAN & TUTrLE, supra note 10, § 428; Grossman, supra note 10, at 390-91.
20 RESTATEMENT OFJUDGMENTS § 93 (1942); see also Gramatan Home Investors Corp. v.
Lopez, 386 N.E.2d 1328, 1332 (N.Y. 1979) ("[Clollateral estoppel bars not only parties
from a previous action from litigating an issue decided therein, but those in privity with
them as well.").
21 See 1 FREEMAN & TUTITLE, supra note 10, § 429 ("Notwithstanding the self-evident
justice and propriety of the rule that estoppels must be mutual, and that no man shall bind
another by an adjudication which he himself is at liberty to disregard, instances are not
rare where the rule has been denied or overlooked by courts and judges .... The doctrine
of mutuality has been held inapplicable in certain classes of cases where persons not par-
ties to ajudgment have been allowed its benefit apparently on the theory that they were 'so
connected in interest or liability with the parties that the judgments when recovered could
be regarded as virtually recovered for them.'" (quoting Hill v. Bain, 23 A. 44, 45 (R.I.
1885))).
1462 [Vol. 94:1459
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parties was not liable could be used by the other parties. 22 Another
traditional exception existed where the liability of one party arose
solely from the conduct of another.23 Joint obligees, absent fraud or
collusion, would be bound by a judgment against a co-obligee. 24 A
judgment determining the question of insurance coverage has tradi-
tionally been preclusive in a subsequent action by another injured
person against the insurer. 25 Yet another traditional exception to the
requirement of mutuality arose when a defendant in the subsequent
litigation had a right of indemnity against a party in the prior litiga-
tion.26 Similarly, ajudgment in favor of a third party against a servant
might establish a limit to the damages possible in a subsequent, re-
lated suit against the master. 27 But some courts allowed an exception
to the general requirement of mutuality only for defensive uses of is-
22 RESTATEMENT OFJUDGMENTS § 100 (1942).
23 Id. § 99 ("A valid judgment on the merits and not based on a personal defense, in
favor of a person charged with the commission of a tort or a breach of contract, bars a
subsequent action by the plaintiff against another responsible for the conduct of such per-
son if the action is based solely upon the existence of a tort or breach of contract by such
person, whether or not the other person has a right of indemnity."); see, e.g., Christianson
v. Hager, 64 N.W.2d 35 (Minn. 1954) (giving preclusive effect to a prior judgment that no
assault had occurred in a subsequent suit against the proprietor of the ballpark where the
assault was alleged to have taken place).
24 RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 102 (1942); see, e.g., Ionian Shipping Co. v. British
Law Ins. Co., 426 F.2d 186, 191 (2d Cir. 1970).
25 An example is Wright v. Schick, 16 N.E.2d 321 (Ohio 1938). After Althea Wright
and Bertie Wright were injured in an automobile accident with Schick, Althea and Bertie
sued separately. Id. at 323. At the trial of Althea's case, ajury found that Schick's liability
insurance was in force at the time of the accident. Id. at 323. The Ohio Supreme Court
ruled that the trial court was correct in giving the determination of insurance coverage
preclusive effect in the subsequent trial over Bertie's claim. Id. at 327.
26 This situation commonly arose when a third party had a claim against a servant, but
tem tirdI partLy coulalUs pursue UIC salell ll-, agai~tI II th mst. Se SRicHARD H. rIELD
ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE 749 (9th ed. 2007). For example,
if the third party sued the master (which was likely because the master tended to have
more money), then the master would have a right of indemnification against the servant.
If the third party first sued the servant, and the defendant servant prevailed on the issue of
his or her own liability, then courts would allow the master, in subsequent litigation, to use
the prior holding in the servant's favor to preclude the third party from relitigating the
issue of the servant's liability. Because the master would have the right of indemnity
against the servant, a victory by the third party against the master would essentially have
undone the servant's victory in the first suit. Therefore, most courts permitted an excep-
tion to the mutuality requirement and allowed the master, who was not a party to the prior
litigation, to use the prior judgment to estop the third party from relitigating the issue of
liability. See RESTATEMENT OFJUDGMENTs § 96(1)(a) (1942); see, e.g., Laffoon v. Waterman
S.S. Corp., 111 F. Supp. 923, 928 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). If the third party sued the master/
indemnitee first, however, the judgment would not have preclusive effect in a subsequent
suit against the servant/indemnitor. See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 96(2) (1942); see,
e.g., Makariw v. Rinard, 336 F.2d 333, 335 (3d Cir. 1964).
27 See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 96(1) (b) (1942); FIELD ET AL., supra note 26, at
749 n.a ("[A] judgment for T against S for $200 fixed that as the maximum liability of M if
T, not having satisfied his judgment against S, sued M." (citing Pinnix v. Griffin, 20 S.E.2d
366 (N.C. 1942))).
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sue preclusion, 28 reasoning that only in this context would this secon-
dary liability rationale be implicated.
29
II
THE DECLINE OF THE MUTUALITY REQUIREMENT
The doctrine of mutuality has long been criticized.30 Indeed, Jer-
emy Bentham noted:
There is reason for saying that a man shall not lose his cause in
consequence of the verdict given in a former proceeding to which
he was not a party; but there is no reason whatever for saying that he
shall not lose his cause in consequence of the verdict in a proceed-
ing to which he was a party, merely because his adversary was not.3 t
Over time, criticism of the traditional requirement of mutuality
grew. 32 These arguments focused on the perceived unfairness of al-
lowing a party who lost in a prior litigation to relitigate the same issue
against a different party.3 3 Even so, support remained firm for the
proposition that the one against whom issue preclusion could be as-
serted must have been party to the prior action.
34
28 Nonmutual collateral estoppel-as well as collateral estoppel generally-can be
categorized as either offensive or defensive. See Brainerd Currie, Mutuality of Collateral
Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REV. 281, 289-322 (1957); see alsoJames
L. Stengel & Laurie Strauch Weiss, Issue and Claim Preclusion, in 1 COMMERCIAL LITIGATION
IN NEW YORK STATE COURTS § 14:25 (Robert L. Haig ed., 2d ed. 2005) (defining offensive
and defensive uses of issue preclusion). Offensive nonmutual collateral estoppel (or issue
preclusion), as its name suggests, arises when a plaintiff who was not a party to the prior
litigation seeks to use a finding from the prior litigation against the present defendant. See
United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 159 n.4 (1984). On the other hand, defensive
nonmutual collateral estoppel (or issue preclusion) arises when a defendant seeks to pre-
clude a plaintiff from relitigating an issue that was decided against the present plaintiff in a
prior action to which the present defendant was not a party. See id. (citing Parklane Ho-
siery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.4 (1979)).
29 See CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 14, at 172 (citing, as an example, Elder v. N.Y. &
Pa. Motor Express, Inc., 31 N.E.2d 188 (N.Y. 1940)).
30 See Pennington v. Snow, 471 P.2d 370, 376 (Alaska 1970); Herbert Semmel, Collat-
eral Estoppel, Mutuality and Joinder of Parties, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1457, 1461 (1968).
31 3 JERE sY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 579 (1827).
32 Cf Robert von Moschzisker, ResJudicata, 38 YALE L.J. 299, 303 (1929) ("It may be
argued that better administration of law would result if the rule simply demanded that the
one against whom a former judgment is used shall have been a party to that judgment, or
shall have been in privity with one who was a party, without demanding that the one seek-
ing to use the judgment shall likewise be so situated." (emphasis omitted)).
33 See, e.g., id. ("[A] litigant, having lost a battle on questions of fact, is permitted to
reopen all the old issues in a second action, provided he has a new adversary not in a
position to set up the former judgment as determining those matters.").
34 Cf., e.g., Benson v. Wanda Petroleum Co., 468 S.W.2d 361, 363 (Tex. 1971) ("Due
process requires that the rule of collateral estoppel operate only against persons who have
had their day in court either as a party to the prior suit or as a privy, and, where not so,
that, at the least, the presently asserted interest was actually and adequately represented in
the prior trial. . . . [as where] a person who is not a party but who controls an ac-
tion .. ."); ANN E. WOODLEY, LITIGATING IN FEDERAL COURT: A GUIDE TO THE RULES 107
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In 1934, a Delaware court adopted a broad fairness exception to
mutuality, stating:
[A] plaintiff who deliberately selects his forum and there unsuccess-
fully presents his proofs, is bound by such adverse judgment in a
second suit involving all the identical issues already decided. The
requirement of mutuality must yield to public policy. To hold oth-
erwise would be to allow repeated litigation of identical questions,
expressly adjudicated, and to allow a litigant having lost on a ques-
tion of fact to re-open and re-try all the old issues each time he can
obtain a new adversary not in privity with his former one.3 5
In Bernhard v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass'n3 6 the
California Supreme Court announced a broad doctrinal shift toward
nonmutual collateral estoppel. A probate court had previously de-
cided that contested money had actually been given by the decedent
to the executor of her estate as a gift.37 Bernhard, appointed execu-
trix after discharge of the prior executor, brought a civil suit against
the bank that had given the money to the prior executor, alleging that
the bank had wrongly distributed the money.38 The California Su-
preme Court found that, despite not having been a party to the prior
action in probate court, the present executrix of the estate could be
bound by the finding of the probate court that the contested money
was a gift to the prior executor.39 Because the bank would have had a
right of indemnity against the prior executor, this situation would
have fit within the traditional indemnitor-indemnitee exception. 40
Thus, the statements about nonmutual collateral estoppel in the opin-
ion were technically dicta, albeit highly influential dicta.4 1
As of 1965 about a dozen states had embraced Bernhard, accord-
ing to a tally by Professor Brainerd Currie, once a critic of the "Bern-
hard doctrine." 42  Professor Currie observed that the number of
adherents to Bernhard would have been larger, but many states had
not had occasion to consider the issue since Bernhard and many cases
(1999) (defining use of nonmutual issue preclusion against a stranger to the prior action
as a violation of due process).
35 Coca-Cola Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 172 A. 260, 263 (Del. Super. Ct. 1934).
36 122 P.2d 892 (Cal. 1942).
37 Id. at 893.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 895-96.
40 See CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 14, at 175.
41 See id. (noting thatJustice Traynor's Bernhard opinion "constituted dicta, which per-
haps explains Justice Traynor's failure to qualify carefully all the wide implications of his
influential opinion").
42 Brainerd Currie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews, 53 CAL. L. REv. 25, 27, 38-46
(1965).
2009] 1465
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that came before state high courts fell into the traditional
exceptions.43
In Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Founda-
tion,44 the Supreme Court held that defensive use of nonmutual collat-
eral estoppel is possible in federal courts. 45 The Foundation sued a
customer of Blonder-Tongue, alleging patent infringement.46 In a
previous suit against a different party, however, the patent claim that
Blonder-Tongue's customer had allegedly infringed had been found
invalid. 47 The Supreme Court determined that the Foundation was
estopped from asserting infringement 4 because it had had a "full and
fair opportunity"49 to litigate the issue of validity of the patent claim in
the prior suit.
In Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,50 the Supreme Court held that
even offensive use of nonmutual collateral estoppel is possible in fed-
eral courts. 51 The Court further held that, even when the prior adju-
dication did not allow for a jury, the Seventh Amendment right to a
jury trial in civil suits5 2 was not necessarily violated by application of
nonmutual collateral estoppel, even though the party would otherwise
have had a right to have ajury in the present action.5 3 Shore, a stock-
holder, sued Parklane, alleging that it had issued false financial state-
ments. 54 While that action was pending, the SEC sued Parklane and
won declaratory judgment against the company. 55 Shore then moved
for partial summary judgment, asserting that Parklane was estopped
from relitigating the issues that had been decided in the SEC litiga-
tion.56 The Supreme Court held that Parklane could be subject to
nonmutual collateral estoppel, stating that "the preferable approach
for dealing with [problems arising from nonmutuality] in the federal
courts is not to preclude the use of offensive collateral estoppel, but to
grant trial courts broad discretion to determine when it should be
43 Id. at 27.
44 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
45 See id. at 350.
46 Id. at 315-16.
47 Id. at 314-15.
48 Id. at 350.
49 Id. at 347.
50 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
51 See id. at 331.
52 U.S. CONST. amend. VII ("In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by
a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to
the rules of the common law.").
53 Parklane, 439 U.S. at 337.
54 Id. at 324.
55 Id. at 324-25.
56 Id. at 325.
1466 [Vol. 94:1459
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applied. '5 7 The Court mentioned several arguments against offensive
use of nonmutuality, but concluded that they did not apply in this
case because Shore could not have joined the prior action, the com-
pany had ample incentive to litigate fully against the SEC, civil suits
were not only foreseeable but were actually in progress when the SEC
litigation took place, and the procedural differences-primarily a
jury-would not have yielded a different result.58
Today, most states have abandoned mutuality for both defensive
and offensive applications of collateral estoppel. 59 A sizable minority,
57 Id. at 331.
58 Id. at 329-32.
59 See, e.g., Wetzel v. Ariz. State Real Estate Dep't, 727 P.2d 825, 829 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1986) (approving of offensive nonmutual collateral estoppel);Johnson v. Union Pac. R.R.,
104 S.W.3d 745, 751 (Ark. 2003) (stating that offensive collateral estoppel should be per-
missible, but only in limited circumstances); Bassett v. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 727
P.2d 864, 866 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986) (allowing offensive use of nonmutual collateral estop-
pel); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v.Jones, 596 A.2d 414, 422-23 (Conn. 1991) ("[M]utuality of
parties is no longer required to invoke collateral estoppel."); Messick v. Star Enter., 655
A.2d 1209, 1211 (Del. 1995); Mastrangelo v. Sandstrom, Inc., 55 P.3d 298, 303 (Idaho
2002); Herzog v. Lexington Twp., 657 N.E.2d 926, 930 (Il1. 1995); Tofany v. NBS Imaging
Sys., Inc., 616 N.E.2d 1034, 1038 (Ind. 1993) (allowing offensive use of nonmutual collat-
eral estoppel); Hossler v. Barry, 403 A.2d 762, 766 (Me. 1979) ("[T] he doctrine of mutual-
ity of estoppel should no longer govern the application of collateral estoppel in the courts
of this State."); Falgren v. State Bd. of Teaching, 545 N.W.2d 901, 907 (Minn. 1996) (al-
lowing offensive use); In re Caranchini, 956 S.W.2d 910, 914 (Mo. 1997) (same); Cover v.
Platte Valley Pub. Power & Irrigation Dist., 75 N.W.2d 661, 668 (Neb. 1956) (same); Cutter
v. Town of Durham, 411 A.2d 1120, 1121 (N.H. 1980) (same); State v. Gonzalez, 380 A.2d
1128, 1136 (NJ. 1977) (allowing a criminal defendant to rely upon nonmutual collateral
estoppel to suppress evidence that a coindictee had successfully moved to suppress in a
separate hearing); Silva v. State, 745 P.2d 380, 384 (N.M. 1987) ("[W]e hold that the doc-
trine of defensive collateral estoppel may be applied when a defendant seeks to preclude a
plaintiff from relitigating an issue the plaintiff has previously litigated and lost regardless of
whether defendant was privy to the prior suit; and that the doctrine of offensive collateral
estoppel may be applied when a plaintiff seeks to foreclose the defendant from litigating
an issue the defendant has previously litigated unsuccessfully regardless of whether plain-
tiff was privy to the prior action."); Koch v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., 468 N.E.2d 1, 6
(N.Y. 1984) (allowing offensive use of nonmutual issue preclusion); State Farm Fire & Cas.
Co. v. Century Home Components, Inc., 550 P.2d 1185, 1188 (Or. 1976) ("[W]e discarded
the requirement of mutuality as a prerequisite to collateral estoppel. . . ." (citing Bahler v.
Fletcher, 474 P.2d 329, 338 (Or. 1970))); In re Estate of Ellis, 333 A.2d 728, 730-31 (Pa.
1975) (allowing offensive nonmutual collateral estoppel); Doe v. Doe, 551 S.E.2d 257, 259
(S.C. 2001) (same); Scott v. City of Newport, 857 A.2d 317, 321 (Vt. 2004) ("[W]e have
abandoned the doctrine of mutuality .... ); United Pac. Ins. Co. v. Boyd, 661 P.2d 987,
990 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983) (allowing offensive nonmutual collateral estoppel); State ex rel.
Leach v. Schlaegel, 447 S.E.2d 1, 3-4 (W. Va. 1994) (allowing offensive nonmutual collat-
eral estoppel in a civil suit where a matter had been decided in a prior criminal proceed-
ing); Sumpter ex rel. Michelle T. v. Crozier, 495 N.W.2d 327, 335 (Wis. 1993) (concluding
that both offensive and defensive uses are permissible); Tex. W. Oil & Gas Corp. v. First
Interstate Bank of Casper, 743 P.2d 857, 864-65 (Wyo. 1987) (allowing defensive use of
nonmutual collateral estoppel but strongly indicating in dicta that it would follow Bernhard
and Parklane).
Massachusetts generally allows offensive nonmutual collateral estoppel. See, e.g.,
Coastal Oil New Eng., Inc. v. Citizens Fuels Corp., 769 N.E.2d 309, 312 (Mass. App. Ct.
2002); see also, e.g., Bar Counsel v. Bd. of Bar Overseers, 647 N.E.2d 1182, 1185 (Mass.
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however, retain the traditional mutuality requirement. 60 Still others
allow only defensive use of nonmutual collateral estoppel. 61
1995) ("We see no basis forwithholding preclusive effect of civil findings in a subsequent
disciplinary action against an attorney.... We conclude that the offensive use of collateral
estoppel is appropriate in bar disciplainary proceedings."); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Nizi-
olek, 481 N.E.2d 1356, 1362 (Mass. 1985) (allowing offensive collateral estoppel in a civil
proceeding based upon a guilty verdict in a prior criminal proceeding). But cf Niziolek, 481
N.E.2d at 1362 (denying issue-preclusive effect to a guilty plea, but stating that it could be
used as evidence in the subsequent civil proceeding). Massachusetts allows only defensive
nonmutual collateral estoppel when the prior adjudication was before an administrative
agency. See, e.g., Tuper v. N. Adams Ambulance Serv., Inc., 697 N.E.2d 983, 985-86 (Mass.
1998).
60 See, e.g., Redmond v. Bankester, 757 So. 2d 1145, 1151 n.2 (Ala. 1999) (requiring
mutuality of collateral estoppel); Cook Inlet Keeper v. State, 46 P.3d 957, 966 (Alaska
2002) (same); Dep't of Human Res. v. Fleeman, 439 S.E.2d 474, 475 (Ga. 1994) (same);
Regency Park, LP v. City of Topeka, 981 P.2d 256, 265 (Kan. 1999) (same); Hofsommer v.
Hofsommer Excavating, Inc., 488 N.W.2d 380, 384 (N.D. 1992) ("For purposes of both res
judicata and collateral estoppel in this state, only parties or their privies may take advan-
tage of or be bound by the former judgment."); Scales v. Lewis, 541 S.E.2d 899, 901 (Va.
2001) ("' [T]here also must be "mutuality," i.e., a litigant cannot invoke collateral estoppel
unless he would have been bound had the litigation of the issue in the prior action
reached the opposite result."' (quoting Angstadt v. Ad. Mut. Ins. Co., 457 S.E.2d 86, 87
(Va. 1995))).
Florida has allowed only a narrow exception to the mutuality requirement: "[W] here a
defendant in a criminal case has had a full and fair opportunity to present his claim in a
prior criminal proceeding, and a judicial determination is made that he has received the
effective assistance of counsel, then the defendant/attorney in a subsequent civil malprac-
tice action brought by the criminal defendant may defensively assert collateral estoppel."
Zeidwig v. Ward, 548 So. 2d 209, 214 (Fla. 1989). The Florida Supreme Court has empha-
sized the narrow scope of that ruling. See, e.g., E.C. v. Katz, 731 So. 2d 1268, 1270 (Fla.
1999); Stogniew v. McQueen, 656 So. 2d 917, 919 (Fla. 1995). Conversely, there is a fed-
eral requirement that, if winning on a § 1983 claim would "render a conviction or sentence
invalid," then before pursuing the § 1983 claim in federal court, the "§ 1983 plaintiff must
prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by
executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determina-
tion, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus." Heck
v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). This federal rule forecloses the possibility that
the § 1983 plaintiff would later use the results of the § 1983 litigation for issue-preclusion
purposes in an attempt to overturn the criminal conviction or sentence.
61 See, e.g., Chambers v. Ohio Dep't of Human Servs., 145 F.3d 793, 801 n.14 (6th Cir.
1998) ("In Ohio, the general rule is that mutuality of parties is a prerequisite to the offen-
sive use of issue preclusion." (citing Goodson v. McDonough Power Equip., Inc., 443
N.E.2d 978 (Ohio 1983))); Doe v. Doe, 52 P.3d 255, 264-65 (Haw. 2002); Penn v. Iowa
State Bd. of Regents, 577 N.W.2d 393, 399 (Iowa 1998) ("[I]ssue preclusion does not re-
quire mutuality of parties if it is being invoked defensively against a party so connected to
the former action as to be bound by that resolution." (citing Brown v. Kassouf, 558 N.W.2d
161, 163 (Iowa 1997))); Rourke v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 863 A.2d 926, 938 (Md. 2004) (in
dictum) ("[W]e have yet to formally embrace offensive non-mutual collateral estoppel.");
Monat v. State Farm Ins. Co., 677 N.W.2d 843, 852 (Mich. 2004) (adopting defensive non-
mutual collateral estoppel); Thomas M. McInnis & Assocs., Inc. v. Hall, 349 S.E.2d 552, 560
(N.C. 1986) (allowing only defensive nonmutual collateral estoppel); Trinity Indus., Inc. v.
McKinnon Bridge Co., 77 S.W.3d 159, 185 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) ("In Tennessee the of-
fensive use of collateral estoppel requires that the parties be identical in both actions.
Without saying so specifically, however, Tennessee has not required party mutuality in ap-
plying defensive collateral estoppel." (citations omitted)).
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III
MODERN ANALYSES OF NONMUTUAL ISSUE PRECLUSION
A. Modern Criticisms of Nonmutual Preclusion
In Parklane, the Supreme Court laid out many of the principal
criticisms of offensive use of nonmutual issue preclusion: it "does not
promote judicial economy in the same manner as defensive use
does";62 it may be unfair to a defendant because, " [i]f a defendant in
the first action is sued for small or nominal damages, he may have
little incentive to defend vigorously, particularly if future suits are not
foreseeable"; 63 it may be unfair to allow a plaintiff to rely on a judg-
ment that was inconsistent with prior judgments in favor of the
defendant;64 it may be unfair to apply offensive collateral estoppel
"where the second action affords the defendant procedural opportu-
nities unavailable in the first action that could readily cause a different
result. '65 An additional, related criticism is that unfairness is com-
pounded if the result of the first litigation was incorrect.66
1. Fairness
The most obvious implication of nonmutual collateral estoppel is
that, when offensive use is possible, plaintiffs enjoy an increased likeli-
hood of recovery.6 7 Subsequent plaintiffs may benefit from a victory
62 Parklane, 439 U.S. at 329.
63 Id. at 330.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 331. The Restatement (Second) ofJudgments reflects consideration of these fair-
ness concerns by providing for an exception to its general rule of nonmutuality if a party
"lacked full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first action or other circum-
stances justify affording him an opportunity to relitigate the issue." RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 (1982). To illustrate these circumstances, the Second
Restatement includes a number of ambiguous examples. See id. §§ 28(2)-(5), 29(1)-(8).
Parklane involved a situation in which there had been no jury right, and thus no jury trial,
in the prior action, which the SEC had brought seeking only declaratory judgment. Thus,
in Parklane, the Supreme Court determined that allowing nonmutual collateral estoppel
did not violate the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial, even though the defendant
was never able to have its case heard by a jury. See Parklane, 439 U.S. at 335-37. Some
courts go so far as to allow nonmutual issue preclusion based on judicially approved arbi-
tration. See, e.g., Miles v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 589 N.E.2d 314, 317 (Mass. 1992) ("An
arbitration decision can have preclusive effect in a subsequent suit between the same par-
ties or their privies."); cf Mark Lightner, Comment, Pre-Hearing Discovery in Arbitration and
Its Impact on the Application of Nonmutual Offensive Collateral Estoppel, 38 AIz. ST. L.J. 1111,
1117-18, 1126-38 (2006) (arguing that the procedural limitations typical in arbitration
warrant caution in allowing it to be a basis for issue preclusion).
66 See MichaelJ. Waggoner, Fifty Years ofBernhard v. Bank of America Is Enough: Collat-
eral Estoppel Should Require Mutuality but ResJudicata Should Not, 12 REv. LITIG. 391, 409-15
(1993).
67 See Note, A Probabilistic Analysis of the Doctrine of Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel, 76
MICH. L. REV. 612, 641-45 (1978) (demonstrating that in multiplaintiff litigation, non-
mutual collateral estoppel provides a greater expected total award due to the increased
probability of a favorable finding if the suits are brought in series); cf Waggoner, supra
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by a prior plaintiff, but their chances of success suffer little prejudice
when the defendant successfully defends against a prior plaintiff.68
Moreover, should the plaintiffs, as a group, decide to sue in seriatim,
"[t]he first plaintiff might very well be selected for being the most
sympathetic of all potential plaintiffs."69 The ability of earlier plain-
tiffs, as plaintiffs, to select the forum compounds the advantage to sub-
sequent plaintiffs. 70
Forum selection becomes especially important not only because
of the tactical advantages that various courts might offer, but also be-
cause the res judicata law of the rendering forum determines the is-
sue-preclusive effects of a judgment.71 Plaintiffs in early suits can
note 66 (proposing requiring mutuality for collateral estoppel, largely out of fairness con-
cerns, but also proposing that res judicata should not require mutuality-arguing that a
plaintiff should not be able to pursue claims against defendants one at a time but rather
should be forced to choose between waiving claims or proceeding against all defendants
with all claims arising from a single transaction). Other commentators, in examining pres-
sure on litigants to settle, have noted the same effect. See, e.g., Bruce L. Hay, Some Settlement
Effects of Preclusion, 1993 U. ILL. L. REv. 21, 45 (noting that as a result of nonmutual collat-
eral estoppel, "[a] victory for a given plaintiff would then mean a victory (as to common
issues) for the plaintiffs in all subsequent actions"); Note, Exposing the Extortion Gap: An
Economic Analysis of the Rules of Collateral Estoppel, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1940, 1941 (1992)
[hereinafter Economic Analysis] (noting that "a defendant who obtains an adverse judgment
is bound by that judgment in all future suits against him" and that "a later plaintiff may
bind the defendant to a judgment that may itself be inconsistent with prior judgments in
the defendant's favor").
68 See Hay, supra note 67, at 45; Jack B. Weinstein, Revision of Procedure: Some Problems in
Class Actions, 9 BUFF. L. REv. 433, 454 (1960); Economic Analysis, supra note 67, at 1941-42.
However, successive litigation may afford the common defendant an opportunity to hone
its litigation strategy.
69 CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 14, at 176.
70 See id.
71 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to
the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State."); 28 U.S.C. § 1738
(2006) ("IJ]udicial proceedings [of any court of any State] shall have the same full faith
and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as
they have by law or usage in the courts of such State .. "); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90,
96 (1980) (holding that a federal court hearing a § 1983 claim must give a state court
judgment from a criminal trial the same collateral estoppel effect that the state would
apply and stating that "Congress has specifically required all federal courts to give preclu-
sive effect to state-court judgments whenever the courts of the State from which the judg-
ments emerged would do so" (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1738)); Rourke v. Amchem Prods., Inc.,
863 A.2d 926, 935 (Md. 2004) ("[In determining the preclusive effect to be given to the
judgment of a State court, the claim and issue preclusion rules of the State that rendered
the judgment must govern." (citing Bd. of Pub. Works v. Columbia Coll., 84 U.S. 521
(1873))); see also Columbia Coll., 84 U.S. at 529 ("No greater effect can be given to any
judgment of a court of one State in another State than is given to it in the State where
rendered."); cf. Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 507-09 (2001)
(stating that the claim-preclusive effects of a judgment rendered by federal courts sitting in
diversity are determined by federal common law, and deciding that, as a matter of federal
common law, a dismissal on the merits by a federal court sitting in diversity will generally
have the same claim-preclusive effects as under "the law that would be applied by state
courts in the State in which the federal diversity court sits"). But cf Donnell v. City of
Cedar Rapids, 437 F. Supp. 2d 904, 922 (N.D. Iowa 2006) (denying issue-preclusive effect
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choose fora that give their judgments issue-preclusive effects. Later
plaintiffs may therefore induce early plaintiffs to select fora with lib-
eral nonmutual issue-preclusive effects, and these later plaintiffs have
no danger of suffering the consequences of this choice. 72
A defendant facing multiple plaintiffs may feel increased pressure
to settle because of the possibility that subsequent plaintiffs could use
an adverse finding. 73 In a typical dispute between one plaintiff and
one defendant, a case will settle if one party faces a serious disadvan-
tage at trial;74 usually only " [d]ifficult cases falling close to the applica-
ble decisional criterion tend not to settle, because the parties are
more likely to disagree substantially in their predicted outcomes. '75
Because of the potential of liability to many future plaintiffs that could
result from a loss in the present suit, a defendant facing the applica-
tion of nonmutual collateral estoppel may see an expected cost far in
to an award from a state arbitration proceeding). See generally Robert C. Casad, Intersystem
Issue Preclusion and the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 510
(1981). Not only must federal courts give a state court judgment the full preclusive effect
that the rendering state court would give it, but the federal courts also cannot give a state
court judgment more preclusive effect than the rendering state court would give it. See
Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 384 (1985) (citing Migra v.
Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75 (1984)).
72 To what extent plaintiffs may collude in the choice of a forum without being deter-
mined to be a party-in-fact, and thus bound by the judgment although not a nominal party,
is unclear.
73 See Economic Analysis, supra note 67, at 1944 ("[Tlhe true beneficiaries of the cur-
rent rule are not the subsequent plaintiffs, but rather the prior plaintiffs. By winning the
race to the courthouse (and hence to the settlement table), these plaintiffs can extort
considerably more from the defendant in settlement than they could expect to recover at
trial and, under certain circumstances, more than they could possibly recover at trial."); cf
L. Elizabeth Chamblee, Unsettling Efficiency: VWhen Non-Class Aggregation of Mass Torts Creates
Secund-Class Settlements, 65 LA. L. Rev. 157, 226 (2004) (argving that placing too much pres-
sure on defendants to settle largely eliminates incentives to take precautionary measures).
But cf Edward H. Cooper, Aggregation and Settlement of Mass Torts, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1943,
1950 (2000) ("[E]ven a defendant willing to risk the full damages liability that would follow
a fair adjudication of liability will settle for fear that the sheer mass of self-identified victims
will overwhelm reason and force a finding of liability."). For a comprehensive discussion of
how nonmutuality affects expected outcomes and settlement incentives, see generally Eco-
nomic Analysis, supra note 67. But see Hay, supra note 67, at 41-51 (explaining that "settle-
ment will prevent relitigation of the common issue regardless of whether there is nonmutual
preclusion" and that the main benefit of nonmutual collateral estoppel is therefore in
relation to "the substantive terms that parties can successfully demand in settlement").
Whether settlement agreements should have preclusive effect is also a matter of debate.
See, e.g., Seth Nesin, Note, The Benefits of Applying Issue Preclusion to Interlocutory Judgments in
Cases That Settle, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 874, 874-78 (2001); Maureen Castellano, The Secret Deal
That Won the Prozac Case, N.J. L.J., May 1, 1995, at 1.
74 See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L.
REV. 119, 138 (2002).
75 Id. The decisional criterion is approximately the point at which expected out-
comes are equal. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really
Reveal Anything About the Legal System? Win Rates and RemovalJurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. REv.
581, 588 (1998).
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excess of the plaintiffs potential gain from a victory.76 Because a ra-
tional defendant will tend to settle a suit if the expected costs of litiga-
tion plus the expected outcome exceeds the cost of settlement,77
nonmutual collateral estoppel increases the amount at which a defen-
dant would rationally be willing to settle.78 This results in a significant
increase in settlement leverage for plaintiffs, who see no change in
their expected recovery. 79 This settlement advantage can be espe-
cially powerful for plaintiffs in early suits. 80
Alternatively, should the first case go to trial, there is an unfair
effect upon the first plaintiff: the defendant will have a much greater
incentive to litigate, inevitably leading to a mismatch of resources
committed to litigation tilted in favor of the defendant.8' Factors
favoring settlement are often strong, however, and future effects of
collateral estoppel are often uncertain, so it is unclear how severe an
impact this tendency has on litigation, especially when compared to
other fairness concerns.8 2
Fairness concerns become especially poignant in the context of
criminal proceedings.8 3 Setting aside the effects of preclusion in crim-
76 See Economic Analysis, supra note 67, at 1953-54.
77 This is not universally true; defendants may have other rational reasons to litigate
rather than settle: for example, to delay payment or to develop a reputation for rejecting
claims.
78 See Economic Analysis, supra note 67, at 1953-54.
79 This is based on an assessment of one plaintiffs expected recovery and neglects the
potential for a preceding favorable result on which the plaintiff can rely. The plaintiffs
expected recovery will be the probability of victory multiplied by the amount of damages
recovered. Of course, in reality, there are multiple potential outcomes, so the expected
recovery is the integral of all expected outcomes multiplied by their probabilities. Addi-
tionally, the result is also a function of the quantity of resources devoted to litigation, so
that too should be treated as a variable quantity when comparing the expected outcome to
a settlement offer.
80 See Economic Analysis, supra note 67, at 1953-54. But see Michael D. Green, The In-
ability of Offensive Collateral Estoppel to Fulfill Its Promise: An Examination of Estoppel in Asbestos
Litigation, 70 IowA L. Ruv. 141, 183-84 (1984) (discussing conflicting views of the effects of
collateral estoppel on settlements and describing the 'judicial view of the efficacy of collat-
eral estoppel in stimulating settlements" as "apparendy inflated").
A plaintiff with related claims against multiple defendants would pose a near-mirror
image of this analysis. In that scenario, each defendant would face only the prospect of a
small loss (compared to the plaintiff's potential loss of all future claims against other de-
fendants), so the defendant may have a lesser incentive to litigate or settle than the plain-
tiff. See Assaf Hamdani & Alon Klement, The Class Defense, 93 CAL. L. REv. 685, 736-38
(2005).
81 See Green, supra note 80, at 184-85.
82 See id. at 185-86 (concluding that "the possibility of future preclusion may generate
some inefficiencies in the form of intensified litigation, but the overall impact is probably
not as significant as other matters"). The availability of nonmutual collateral estoppel can
also influence witness testimony: "Nonmutual issue preclusion means that nonparty wit-
nesses have reason to cooperate-and perhaps to testify in a particular manner-when
they stand to benefit from the nonmutual issue-preclusive effect of a judgment." Howard
M. Erichson, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, 96 MicH. L. REv. 945, 960 (1998).
83 Although the doctrine of issue preclusion originated in civil litigation, its
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inal proceedings, there are heightened fairness concerns surrounding
the preclusive effects of criminal proceedings.84 Not only do the re-
sults of criminal trials have issue-preclusive effects, but even guilty
pleas can have issue-preclusive effects. Criminal defendants faced
with civil liability may feel pressure to settle civil claims quickly to
avoid the additional distraction while the criminal case is ongoing.85
Allowing a civil plaintiff to rely on the findings in a criminal case gives
that plaintiff an incentive to wait and see what the government discov-
ers, effectively giving one party to a civil suit the advantage of the gov-
ernment's superior investigatory power and resources.8 6 Moreover, a
criminal defendant could reveal incriminating information in civil dis-
covery87-this may cause the defendant to use delay tactics in defend-
ing the civil suit, compounding the pressure on the defendant to
settle the civil suit.88
2. Right to a Jury in Civil Trials
Although the Supreme Court determined that the application of
nonmutual issue preclusion in the circumstances of Parklane did not
offend the Seventh Amendment right to a civil jury,89 other situations
application in criminal contexts is "embodied in the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution." People v. Somerville, 771 N.Y.S.2d 866,
871-72 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004) (citing Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445 (1970)); see Smith
v. Dinwiddie, 510 F.3d 1180, 1186-87 (10th Cir. 2007). See generally Note, The Due Process
Roots of Criminal Collateral Estoppel, 109 HARv. L. REv. 1729 (1996) (examining different
interpretations of criminal collateral estoppel doctrine and how it differs from the Double
Jeopardy Clause).
84 Findings resulting in a criminal conviction may have preclusive effect against the
unsuccessful criminal defendant in any subsequent civil litigation, but a successful criminal
defendant may not use findings in favor of an acquittal for collateral estoppel purposes in a
subsequent civil proceeding-this is true even when the subsequent proceeding is against
the state, in which case there would be mutuality. See, e.g., Donley v. Donley, 686 A.2d 943,
945-46 (Vt. 1996) ("Defendant's acquittal of domestic assault charges under a beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt standard did not preclude the family court, under a preponderance-of-
the-evidence standard, from extending an abuse-prevention order to protect the complain-
ant's safety, even though the same conduct led to the order and the criminal charges.").
85 SeeJonathan C. Thau, Collateral Estoppel and the Reliability of Criminal Determinations:
Theoretical, Practical, and Strategic Implications for Criminal and Civil Litigation, 70 GEO. L.J.
1079, 1120 (1982). Criminal defendants may feel especially pressured to settle civil suits
early and quickly because of the possibility that a civil plaintiff might later use the results of
the criminal trial. Id.
86 See id.
87 See id. at 1119.
88 See id.
89 Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 333-37 (1979). Parklane involved a
situation in which there had been no jury right, and thus no jury trial, in the prior action,
which was brought by the SEC, who sought only declaratory judgment. Thus, in deciding
Parklane, the Supreme Court also explicitly declared that allowing nonmutual collateral
estoppel where the defendant was never able to have a jury hear its case did not violate the
Seventh Amendment right to ajury trial. Going even farther in this direction, some com-
mentators have proposed a regime whereby non-economic damages are not litigated but,
rather, are determined by comparison to similar suits-this is essentially what appellate
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in which courts might allow nonmutual collateral estoppel might vio-
late the Seventh Amendment. For example, some courts will allow
nonmutual collateral estoppel based on judicially approved arbitra-
tion, even though the arbitration procedures, especially regarding dis-
covery, may offer less protection than those of a civil trial.90 This may
be especially troublesome where one of the contracting parties is not
free to refuse waiving its right to a jury trial.9' Proceedings for minor
"quasi-criminal" offenses, such as those for minor traffic violations, 92
could also have preclusive effect in subsequent litigation. 93 And ad-
ministrative proceedings, such as workers' compensation hearings,
that have more relaxed procedures than judicially controlled civil liti-
gation, may also be given preclusive effect. 94
courts do when determining whether damages are "excessive." SeeJoEllen Lind, The End of
Trial on Damages? Intangible Losses and Comparability Review, 51 BuFF. L. REv, 251, 270-97
(2003).
90 See Brian Levine, Note, Preclusion Confusion: A Call for Per Se Rules Preventing the Appli-
cation of Collateral Estoppel to Findings Made in Nontraditional Litigation, 1999 ANN. SURV. AM.
L. 435, 448-59 (arguing that courts should adopt per se rules denying issue-preclusive
effects to nontraditional litigation in order to improve predictability and thereby facilitate
efficient use of nontraditional litigation settings); Lightner, supra note 65, at 1138 ("[I1n
light of procedural inadequacies [of arbitration discovery and proceedings], preclusive
doctrines must be met with extreme caution . . . ."); cf Wayne J. Positan & Domenick
Carmagnola, Employment Torts, in BUSINEss TORTS LITIGATION 81, 123 (David A. Soley et al.
eds., 2d ed. 2005) (noting that arbitration or administrative proceedings may have preclu-
sive effects in subsequent litigation). For example, in Aufderhar v. Data Dispatch, Inc., 452
N.W.2d 648 (Minn. 1990), the preceding arbitration proceeding was heard and decided by
personal injury lawyers rather than ajudge or magistrate. The Minnesota Supreme Court
deemed the arbitration to have preclusive effect. Id. at 652, 654.
91 See Onvoy, Inc. v. SHAL, LLC, 669 N.W.2d 344, 357 (Minn. 2003) (Anderson, J.,
concurring) ("[W]e need to be mindful of the potential for individuals to unknowingly
and involuntarily waive their constitutional right to a trial by jury."); Kloss v. Edward D.
Jones & Co., 54 P.3d 1, 12-14 (Mont. 2002) (Nelson,J., concurring) (discussing Montana's
constitutional protection of a right to trial byjury in the context of standard-form contracts
of adhesion).
92 See, e.g., Helen W. Gunnarsson, Bohner Redux: Insured Properly Denied Coverage for
"Illegal" Act, 7CA Rules, 94 ILL. B.J. 168, 168 (2006) (noting that "speeding and running
stop signs, for example, are not considered criminal offenses, but, rather, are quasi-crimi-
nal" as opposed to DUI, which qualifies as a criminal offense (describing the holding in
Bohner v. Ace Am. Ins. Co., 834 N.E.2d 635 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005))); Illya Lichtenberg, The
Bus Sweep Controversy: Agency, Authority and the Unresolved Issues of Third Party Consent, 81 U.
DET. MERCY L. REV. 145, 164 n.184 (describing pedestrian traffic on an interstate highway
as "a criminal or quasi-criminal offense"); Heather M. Bell et al., The Year in Review, The
Year in Review 2001: Cases from Alaska Supreme Court, Alaska Court of Appeals, U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska, 19 ALASKA L. REV.
201, 236 (2002) (describing "traffic infractions" as "within a class of 'quasi-criminal of-
fenses'" and describing the "violation" of consumption of alcohol by a minor as "quasi-
criminal" (citing State v. Euteneier, 31 P.3d 111 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001))).
93 See generally Sheryl L. Musgrove & David W. Gross, Use of a Traffic Citation in a Subse-
quent Related Civil Proceeding, 33 IDAHO L. REV. 135, 145 (1996) (advocating for "a rule
disallowing any and all evidence of the [traffic] citation and related pleas, convictions and
payment" in subsequent civil litigation).
94 See, e.g., Alba v. Raytheon Co., 809 N.E.2d 516, 521-22 (Mass. 2004) (giving a work-
ers' compensation ruling preclusive effect); Corrigan v. Gen. Elec. Co., 548 N.E.2d 1238,
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3. Efficiency Gains from Nonmutuality Are Illusory
Nonmutuality may not foster the efficiency gains that its support-
ers envisioned. Because of the increased probability of success,
"[p]laintiffs who might otherwise join together, or intervene, in a sin-
gle lawsuit under modern permissive joinder rules would have incen-
tive to sue separately and to hang back awaiting another plaintiffs
favorable result.'95 In this way, "f[u] nlimited use of offensive, non-mu-
tual issue preclusion can generate, rather than deter, multiple law-
suits."9 6 Compounding this effect, a loss in any suit can lead to
liability to all remaining plaintiffs, inducing a defendant to expend
more effort defending each case than it would otherwise.
97
Many a prudent litigant might be willing to [default or pursue a
moderate litigation strategy] because of the comparative insignifi-
cance of [one] claim and costliness of full and thorough litiga-
tion . . . if the consequences of the judgment are limited to the
parties before the court. On the other hand, such a litigant would
be forced to take a more aggressive position-often to the detri-
ment of both his adversary and himself-and litigate the suit to the
utmost, if deprived of the protection that the mutuality requirement
affords .... 98
Thus, "[t]he abandonment of mutuality ... instead of reducing the
amount ofjudicial effort required to resolve disputes turning on com-
mon issues . . . might have the opposite effect."9 9
B. Alternatives to Mutuality
Although most jurisdictions now allow nonmutual collateral es-
toppel, the law in this area continues to change, and perhaps some
jurisdictions will reconsider their abandonment of the mutuality re-
quirement.' 0 0 Some courts allow nonmutual defensive use of collat-
1240 (Mass. 1990) (giving preclusive effect to a workers' compensation ruling in a subse-
quent suit brought by the employee's wife for loss of consortium).
95 CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 14, at 176; see also DAVID A. DITrFURTH, THE CON-
CEPTS AND METHODS OF FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE 270-71 (1999); Semmel, supra note 30,
at 1473.
96 DITrFURTH, supra note 95, at 271; see also Semmel, supra note 30, at 1473 (citing, as
an example, B.R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 225 N.E.2d 195 (N.Y. 1967)).
97 See CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 14, at 176.
98 James Wm. Moore & Thomas S. Currier, Mutuality and Conclusiveness of Judgments,
35 TUL. L. REV. 301, 309 (1961). Ultimately, this may place increased strain on the courts'
time as well as drain the litigants' resources.
99 CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 14, at 176.
100 See id. at 185. For example, Alaska appears to have revived its requirement of mutu-
ality of collateral estoppel. Compare Cook Inlet Keeper v. State, 46 P.3d 957, 966 (Alaska
2002) ("There are three necessary elements to a claim of collateral estoppel: '(1) the issue
decided in a prior adjudication was precisely the same as that presented in the action in
question; (2) the prior litigation must have resulted in a finaljudgment on the merits; and
(3) there must be "mutuality" of parties, i.e., collateral estoppel may be invoked only by
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eral estoppel but refuse to allow offensive use of nonmutual collateral
estoppel.' 0 l Commentators have proposed several additional alterna-
tives to requiring mutuality for collateral estoppel to apply, including
mandatory joinder of all interested parties,10 2 allowing the use of the
results of adjudication against those who were not parties to the prior
litigation,10 3  and allowing the use of former adjudication as
evidence. 0 4
1. Allowing Only Defensive Use
Although not technically an alternative to nonmutuality, limiting
the application of nonmutual collateral estoppel to defensive uses is
the most common alternative to full abandonment of the mutuality
requirement. Several states currently allow defensive use of non-
mutual collateral estoppel but refuse to permit offensive use of non-
mutual collateral estoppel. 10 5
It has been further proposed that even defensive use of collateral
estoppel should be permissible only in situations in which the party to
those who were parties or privies to the action in which the judgment was rendered."'
(quoting Briggs v. State, 732 P.2d 1078, 1081-82 (Alaska 1987))), with Pennington v. Snow,
471 P.2d 370, 377 (Alaska 1970) (" [M]utuality of estoppel will not as a rule be necessary for
the invocation of resjudicata or collateral estoppel against a party."). Michigan recently
rejected a mutuality requirement for defensive use of collateral estoppel, see Monat v. State
Farm Ins. Co., 677 N.W.2d 843, 852 (Mich. 2004) (adopting defensive nonmutual collat-
eral estoppel), while restating its rejection of offensive nonmutual collateral estoppel. Id.
at 848 n.5 (stating that its holding is consistent with Howell v. Vito's Trucking & Excavating
Co., 191 N.W.2d 313, 317 (Mich. 1971) (rejecting offensive nonmutual collateral estop-
pel)). Kansas, in dicta in Goetz v. Board of Trustees, Policemen's & Firemen's Retirement System,
454 P.2d 481, 489 (Kan. 1969), seemed to abandon a requirement of mutuality, comment-
ing that "collateral estoppel does not require mutuality of parties," but appears to maintain
a requirement of mutuality for collateral estoppel. SeeJetcraft Corp. v. FlightSafety Int'l,
Inc., 781 F. Supp. 687, 692-93 (D. Kan. 1991) (noting numerous Kansas Supreme Court
cases that disagree with Goetz); see, e.g., Jones v. Bordman, 759 P.2d 953, 965 (Kan. 1988)
(refusing to allow offensive collateral estoppel); McDermott v. Kan. Pub. Serv. Co., 712
P.2d 1199, 1209 (Kan. 1986) (stating, in a case involving offensive use of nonmutual collat-
eral estoppel, that "we did not then and we do not now abandon the mutuality rule");
Keith v. Schiefen-Stockham Ins. Agency, Inc., 498 P.2d 265, 273 (Kan. 1972) (disallowing
defensive use of nonmutual collateral estoppel); Adamson v. Hill, 449 P.2d 536, 539 (Kan.
1969) (refusing to allow offensive use of nonmutual collateral estoppel).
101 See CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 14, at 177; cases cited supra note 61.
102 See CAsAD & CLERMONT, supra note 14, at 185-87 (citing Elinor P. Schroeder, Reliti-
gation of Common Issues: The Failure of Nonparty Preclusion and an Alternative Proposal, 67 IOWA
L. REv. 917 (1982)).
103 See id. at 187 (citing Michael A. Berch, A Proposal to Permit Collateral Estoppel of Non-
parties Seeking Affirmative Relief, 1979 ARIz. ST. LJ. 511).
104 See id. at 187-88 (citing Hiroshi Motomura, UsingJudgments as Evidence, 70 MINN. L.
REv. 979 (1986)).
105 For example, Hawaii allows only defensive use of nonmutual collateral estoppel.
See Doe v. Doe, 52 P.3d 255, 264-65 (Haw. 2002); Morneau v. Stark Enters., Ltd., 539 P.2d
472, 474-76 (Haw. 1975); Ellis v. Crockett, 451 P.2d 814, 822 (Haw. 1969). Similarly, Mich-
igan, when adopting defensive use of nonmutual collateral estoppel, restated its opposition
to a rule permitting offensive applications. See Monat, 677 N.W.2d at 848 n.5.
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be precluded was the plaintiff in the prior action. 10 6 The reasoning
behind this proposal is that, as plaintiff, the common party chose the
forum and timing of the first suit.
2. Mandatory Joinder
Mandatoryjoinder requires plaintiffs to join their claims together
in a single suit-under mandatory joinder, plaintiffs who could have
participated, but did not, will find their claims barred. The result is
that common matters will be tried all at once. 10 7 Making all determi-
nations in a single action maximizes efficiency and minimizes the dan-
ger of inconsistent results.10 8 At the same time, the unfairness that
results from nonmutuality-that plaintiffs may benefit from a
favorable determination in an action by a prior plaintiff without dan-
ger of being bound by an adverse determination-is eliminated (or at
least reduced). Under a regime of mandatory joinder, all plaintiffs
may benefit from the result, but, simultaneously, all will be bound by
the result. Mandatory joinder "restores procedural neutrality by
equating the parties' litigating risk, [and] nicely demonstrates by con-
trast the most serious defect of nonmutuality, the destruction of pro-
cedural neutrality."'0 9
A closely related proposal would encourage joinder by making
the issue-preclusive effects of a judgment dependent upon whether a
party seeking to assert preclusion could have been a party to the prior
proceeding.110 Under this proposal, issue preclusion is available
against a party to the prior action if that party could have caused its
opponent in the subsequent action to be joined in the first action but
failed to do so, or if the party to be precluded could have requested
consolidation of the actions but failed to do so."' t Similarly, one who
was not a party to the first action but could have been, or could have
requested consolidation of the actions, cannot assert issue preclusion
against an opponent who was a party to the first action. 112 Under this
proposal, issue preclusion is not available to those who could not have
106 See CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 14, at 177-78.
107 See id. at 185.
108 See generally John C. McCoid, A Single Package for Multiparty Disputes, 28 STAN. L. REv.
707, 724-28 (1976) (advocating mandatory joinder as an alternative means to nonmutual-
ity for achieving efficiency and consistency in resolving multiparty disputes while affording
all plaintiffs an opportunity to be heard).
109 CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 14, at 185 (citing Schroeder, supra note 102).
110 See Semmel, supra note 30, at 1475 (proposing rules to govern the availability of
issue preclusion in the absence of mutuality so as to encourage joinder and consolidation
whenever possible).
111 See id. at 1475 R. 1.
112 See id. at R. 2. Where either party could have caused joinder or consolidation,
preclusion would be available against the party to the first action. See id.
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participated in the prior proceeding (for instance, because ofjurisdic-
tional limitations). 113
Bringing all parties into one suit may, however, lead to procedu-
ral complexity and conflation of noncommon issues. 114 Furthermore,
"not all the nonparties who ought to be joined may be subject to the
jurisdiction of the court, and therefore, repetitive litigation may be
unavoidable."' 15 And, assuming that not all the plaintiffs desire to
pursue their claims in the same court, at least some will not get their
chosen forum. 116 Thus, despite some benefits, mandatory joinder
does not appear to be a panacea for the problems raised by
nonmutuality.
3. Collateral Class Actions
Under collateral-class-action proposals, plaintiffs would be bound
by determinations made in an earlier suit to which they were not par-
ties.1 7 Class treatment for similarly situated plaintiffs is based on the
premise that "if a person's point of view on a common issue has been
asserted adequately in an earlier action, even by a totally unrelated
litigant .... there is no reason to permit that issue to be contested
again in another suit by that person or someone else similarly situ-
ated."118 Under a collateral-class-action regime, "[t]he cure [to un-
fairness created by nonmutuality] would be to reintroduce mutuality,
but to do so by binding as well as benefiting strangers."' 19 Treating
plaintiffs as a cl4ss would greatly improve efficiency in deciding com-
mon matters and prevent inconsistent determinations. 20 Ultimately,
however, "[t] here are too many unfathomable variations in the course
of discovery, pretrial, and trial to allow the assertion that confidence
in the result is always warranted" under a regime of collateral class
actions. 12 1 "The collateral-class-action proposal would create in effect
a compulsory class action without the careful limitations and protec-
tions" that surround class actions as they presently exist. 122
113 Id. at 1478.
114 See Schroeder, supra note 102, at 918.
115 Id. at 918-19; see also McCoid, supra note 108, at 726-27.
116 This could lead to a race to file, in which only the first plaintiff to file will see his or
her choice of forum honored.
117 See generally Lawrence C. George, Sweet Uses of Adversity: Parklane Hosiery and the
Collateral Class Action, 32 STAN. L. REV. 655 (1980) (analyzing the effects of treating simi-
larly situated plaintiffs as a class).
118 Schroeder, supra note 102, at 921-22 (evaluating the potential effects of broad
nonparty preclusion (citing George, supra note 117, at 659-64, 670-74)).
119 CASAD & CLERMON T, supra note 14, at 187.
120 See Schroeder, supra note 102, at 922.
121 Id. at 980.
122 CASAD & CLERMONr, supra note 14, at 187. For example, Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 23 limits the situations in which litigants may employ a class action. See id.
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4. Use of Former Adjudication as Evidence
Another proposal is to allow the use of the results of prior adjudi-
cation as evidence.1 23 This approach would permit fact finders to
evaluate the probative value of the prior judgment.12 4 However, the
degree to which a jury will feel constrained to follow this is uncertain,
and it is likely to be highly influenced by the instructions of the presid-
ing judge.12 5 Furthermore, this proposal would often create conflict
where a judgment rendered by a court that permits prior judgments
as evidence is then introduced as nonpreclusive evidence in a court
under whose procedures this evidence is impermissible hearsay. 12 6
5. Other Flexible Approaches to Nonmutual Collateral Estoppel
The appropriateness of allowing nonmutual collateral estoppel in
any case depends, inter alia, on the nature of the former adjudica-
tion-particularly whether procedural infirmities should nullify its au-
thority in subsequent proceedings. For example, just fifteen years
after Bernhard, in Taylor v. Hawkinson,t 27 the California Supreme
Court upheld a trial court's refusal to allow a plaintiff's offensive use
of nonmutual collateral estoppel where the verdict on which the
plaintiff sought to rely appeared to be a compromise verdict. The
plaintiff and her husband had been successful coplaintiffs in a negli-
gence action. 2s Ms. Taylor, however, sought a new trial because of
insufficient damages.' 29 The court awarded her a new trial, and she
sought to limit the retrial to the issue of damages by contending that
her husband's successful litigation on the issue of liability could be the
basis for nonmutual collateral estoppel and, therefore, the defendant
could be estopped from contesting liability. But the trial court sub-
tIIe issue of I' : l .,, -.
iiiiLLyU to .... ury, which returned _..a -U) LI in
favor of the defendant.1 30 The California Supreme Court first deter-
mined that the trial court, in granting a new trial, correctly believed
that "the verdicts following the first trial were compromise verdicts
123 See id.
124 It might also open the door to a common defendant offering prior judgments in its
favor.
125 See CAsAD & CLERMONT, supra note 14, at 188. This would, in essence, change the
criterion from whether the prior judgment is preclusive or nonpreclusive, as decided by
the rendering court, to the weight that the fact finder in the subsequent litigation should
give the prior conclusions. By changing this determination, the subsequent court would
be able to substitute its own preclusion doctrine for that of the rendering court, effectively
circumventing the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
126 The resjudicata law of the rendering court determines the preclusive effects of a
judgment. See supra note 71.
127 306 P.2d 797 (Cal. 1957).
128 Id. at 798.
129 Id.
130 Id.
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and that the jury did not determine the issue of liability.' 3 1 Because
the first jury's verdict was a compromise verdict, the California Su-
preme Court believed "it [did] not constitute such a determination of
the issues involved as to render them resjudicata where distinct rights
are sought to be litigated in a separate cause of action."1 3 2 In his dis-
senting opinion, Justice Carter1 3 3 contended that the judgment in the
first suit must be resjudicata because it was binding on the parties still
subject to it' 34 -Ms. Taylor's husband and the defendant-or else
"[i]f the jury did not decide [the issue of liability], it decided nothing,
and the judgment entered on its verdict would not be binding on the
parties thereto."' 35
The refusal to give preclusive effect to compromise verdicts is also
enunciated in the Restatement (Second) of Judgments:
A party precluded from relitigating an issue with an opposing party,
in accordance with §§ 27 and 28, is also precluded from doing so
with another person unless the fact that he lacked full and fair op-
portunity to litigate the issue in the first action or other circum-
stances justify affording him an opportunity to relitigate the issue.
The circumstances to which considerations should be given include
those enumerated in § 28 and also whether:
(5) The prior determination may have been affected by relation-
ships among the parties to the first action that are not present in
the subsequent action, or apparently was based on a compromise
verdict or finding .... 136
Taylor v. Hawkinson and the Second Restatement reflect a holistic ap-
proach to evaluating the fairness of the procedure and, importantly,
the result of the prior adjudication.
6. Requiring Consistent Judgments
Another proposed reform would be to deny nonmutual issue-
preclusive effect to ajudgment when inconsistent judgments exist.137
131 Id. at 799.
132 Id.
133 Interestingly, it was Justice Traynor, author of the Bernhard opinion, who wrote the
majority opinion in Taylor v. Hawkinson and exhibited great reluctance to allow nonmutual
collateral estoppel.
134 Taylor, 306 P.2d at 803 (Carter, J., dissenting).
135 Id.
136 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 29 (1982).
137 See FIELD ET AL., supra note 26, at 754-55; see also DrrrFURTH, supra note 95, at 270;
Semmel, supra note 30, at 1466-67 ("In situations of multiple claimants whose suits cannot
be consolidated, the common defendant should never be bound if he wins the first and
then loses a later trial; .... Both judgments should be ignored in the subsequent actions,
not because of lack of mutuality or offensive-defensive distinctions, but because of com-
mon sense."). In Shire LLC v. Sandoz, Inc., No. 07-CV-00197-EWN-CBS, 2008 AL 4402251,
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This would minimize the unfairness of allowing a plaintiff to rely on a
single determination when the defendant has successfully defended.
But the first determination would be all-important, leading the defen-
dant to face great pressure to overlitigate the first suit.' 38 Addition-
ally, because of the primary importance of the first determination,
early plaintiffs would still enjoy a distinct settlement advantage com-
pared to the balance under a regime without nonmutuality.
A similar proposal would deny issue-preclusive effect to a single
judgment-only when multiple, consistent judgments are available
would nonmutual collateral estoppel be permissible. 139 This would
temper the criticality of the first suit, reducing the degree to which
the defendant would overlitigate the first several suits. Some incen-
tive, albeit a lesser one, would still exist. And, early plaintiffs, as a
group, would still enjoy a settlement advantage.
Although each of these proposals acts to address the criticisms of
nonmutuality, they lack the predictability of a per se rule, and it is this
lack of predictability that leads to the principal drawbacks of non-
mutual collateral estoppel.
IV
THREE POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS: LIMITS ON DAMAGES
This Note proposes three different methods of reducing the
problems associated with the offensive use of nonmutual collateral es-
toppel; each is some sort of limit on the damages that can be recov-
at *7 (D. Colo. Sept. 24, 2008), the district court declined to apply nonmutual issue preclu-
sion, in part because in two prior cases courts had come to different conclusions about the
correct internretation of patent claims. The Federal Circuit granted permission to make
an interlocutory appeal on "the issue of whether a patentee who settles an earlier infringe-
ment case after a Markman ruling [on patent claim interpretation] is precluded under the
doctrine of collateral estoppel from relitigating claim-construction issues determined in
the prior case." Shire LLC v. Sandoz, Inc., No. 893, 2009 WL 330235 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 6,
2009). Although the Federal Circuit generally determines the issue-preclusive effects of a
judgment by applying the law of the regional circuit where the case is first heard, see RF
Del., Inc. v. Pac. Keystone Techs., Inc., 326 F.3d 1255, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2003), the Federal
Circuit will make its own law in areas where most of the cases will be appealed to the
Federal Circuit, such as patent-related issues. Cf, e.g., Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innova-
tions, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("Because most cases involving these issues
will therefore be appealed to this court, we conclude that we should decide these issues as
a matter of Federal Circuit law, rather than rely on various regional precedents.").
138 To be sure, this is better than the prevailing nonmutuality doctrine, whereby a
plaintiff feels this pressure to overlitigate all early cases.
139 See Aaron Gershonowitz, Issue Preclusion: The Return of the Multiple Claimant Anomaly,
14 U. BALT. L. REv. 227 (1985). But see State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Century Home Com-
ponents, Inc., 550 P.2d 1185, 1190 (Or. 1976) (dismissing the view that multiple consistent
judgments are necessary for issue preclusion to apply because it is "based on the apprehen-
sion that the first judgment might well be an aberration, but this view fail[s] to recognize
that the very notion of collateral estoppel demands and assumes a certain confidence in
the integrity of the end result of our adjudicative process").
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ered by a plaintiff who relies on nonmutual collateral estoppel to
establish an element of the cause of action: a fixed cap on the amount
of damages; a system whereby the present plaintiff cannot recover
more in damages than the prior plaintiff in the case upon which the
present plaintiff relies to estop the defendant; a system whereby dam-
ages are limited to a fraction of the damages awarded in the case upon
which the present plaintiff relies for collateral estoppel or the most
recent preceding case which also relied upon the original case as a
basis for collateral estoppel.
A. A Set Statutory Cap
The first and simplest proposal is a statutory cap on damages that
can be recovered by a plaintiff who relies upon nonmutual collateral
estoppel to establish an element of the cause of action. This cap
would be similar to limits on damages that have been proposed as part
of tort-reform legislation. 140 This type of limit would reduce, but not
eliminate, incentives for plaintiffs with large claims to "wait and see"
what happens in suits brought by plaintiffs with smaller claims. 14' It
would also limit, but not eliminate, the possibility that a defendant
could face large suits brought by previously unforeseen plaintiffs fol-
lowing a small judgment in favor of a plaintiff with a small claim. 142
140 See, e.g., Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: Presi-
dent Calls for Medical Liability Reform (Jan. 16, 2003), available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030116.html; cf Alexee Deep Conroy,
Note, Lessons Learned from the "Laboratories of Democracy": A Critique of Federal Medical Liability
Reform, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1159, 1180-81 (2006) (noting that, as of 2006, eighteen states
had such caps in place). California was an early leader in tort reform; in 1975 it implemen-
tied a cap on non-economic damages recoverable in a medical malpractice action. See
CALIFORNIANS ALLIED FOR PATIENT PROTECTION, THE MEDICAL INJURY COMPENSATION RE-
FORM ACT: CALIFORNIA'S LANDMARK HEALTHCARE LIABILITY LAW: A NATIONAL MODEL FOR
ASSURING ACCESS TO AFFORDABLE HEALTHCARE 4 (2005), available at http://www.micra.org/
about-micra/docs/micra handbook.pdf. In 2003, Texans voted to amend their constitu-
tion to allow their legislature to implement caps on the amount of non-economic tort
damages. DonaldJ. Palmisano, A Rallying Cry from Texas: Remember Proposition 12!, AM. MED.
NEWS, Oct. 20, 2003, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2003/10/20/edca
1020.htm; cf TEX. CONST. art. III, § 66 (amended 2003). Other states have adopted similar
measures. SeeJohn W. Martin, Jr., State Civil Justice Reform, in CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM: WHAT
Now? 5, 5-6 (Roger Clegg ed., 1996) (outlining the status of various state tort-reform
measures).
141 Plaintiffs with large claims may still prefer to observe litigation over smaller claims
before pursuing their own claims for tactical advantage, such as previewing the defendant's
evidence, allowing plaintiffs with small claims to test possible theories of liability, or to take
advantage of the increased settlement leverage that would result should earlier plaintiffs be
successful.
142 Because plaintiffs claiming damages above the statutory limit could not rely on
nonmutual issue preclusion (unless they wished to limit themselves to damages below the
statutory limit), they would have less incentive to "hide" in hopes that an unsuspecting
defendant would under-litigate and lose an early case against a plaintiff with a small claim.
Additionally, this type of limit would have little effect on the behavior of prospective plain-
tiffs whose claims did not rise above the statutory limit-and it could have little effect on
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The primary virtue of this type of limit is its simplicity-it need not
require assertion by the defendant or any proof of damages awarded
in the prior action that the present plaintiff seeks to use to estop the
defendant.1 43 However, this approach would apply only to suits that
are sufficiently large to exceed this cap, reducing its effectiveness in
correcting the shortcomings of nonmutuality. Furthermore, if the cap
were lower-to more often provide defendants the protection of this
type of cap-then plaintiffs would be much more likely to forgo reli-
ance on collateral estoppel, increasing successive litigation of the
same issues and reducing the efficiency benefits that nonmutuality is
supposed to provide.
B. Limiting a Plaintiffs Damages to the Original Plaintiffs
Damages
The second proposal is a limit whereby a plaintiff who relies on
nonmutual collateral estoppel could not recover more in damages
than the plaintiff in the action on which the present plaintiff relies.
This type of limit would provide defendants a great deal more foresee-
ability of the magnitude of future liability arising from a suit, even
when other plaintiffs are unforeseen. This foreseeability would better
enable defendants to determine the proper level of resources to
devote to defending a claim. This in turn would reduce the tendency
to overlitigate and, therefore, the costs of litigation to both parties. It
would also relieve courts of the burden of presiding over needlessly
protracted litigation over points that may seem unimportant in the
present suit, but, with the availability of unlimited nonmutual collat-
eral estoppel, might provide future plaintiffs with a windfall. Further,
it would reduce the unfair settlement leverage that plaintiffs, espe-
cially those with relatively small claims, enjoy when nonmutual collat-
eral estoppel is available.1 44 Similarly, this approach would reduce the
plaintiffs whose claims were only slightly above the statutory limit. In this way, it would
create a novel conundrum not raised by the typical tort-reform damages limit: plaintiffs
with damages above the statutory limit might have to choose between relying on non-
mutual issue preclusion (increasing their likelihood of recovery, but reducing the amount
of recovery) or forgoing nonmutual issue preclusion (decreasing their likelihood of recov-
ery, but increasing the potential amount of recovery). Of course, this type of evaluation is
common-litigants always must decide whether the likelihood and amount of a potential
recovery is worth the costs and risks of litigation. Furthermore, even when nonmutual
issue preclusion is available, a party may forego precluding its opponent in order to have
more opportunity to present evidence that will paint the opponent in an unfavorable light;
such evidence could be irrelevant if the issue is not in dispute because of issue preclusion.
143 This could be especially important if the prior action is appealed and the damages
reduced. While res judicata law is amply equipped to determine whether the damages
awarded in the prior action are a final judgment, serious fairness concerns would be impli-
cated if a plaintiff could rely upon a prior judgment to set the level of damages in the
present action and thereafter the defendant had the damages in the prior action reduced.
144 When nonmutual collateral estoppel is available, a defendant may feel pressure to
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incentive for plaintiffs to "wait and see" what happens in prior litiga-
tion.1 4 5 If so, plaintiffs may feel that they would benefit from combin-
ing their resources for litigation, thus reducing the burden of
repetitive litigation on the courts.146
Because judges are supposed to ensure that nonmutuality will not
give rise to unfairness, 147 this scheme could be adopted by judicial
decision. Of course, a legislature would be free to make such a rule,
but unlike the more traditional cap on damages described above,'148
this type of limit could be adopted without legislative action. It would
amount to a per se rule that a suit seeking damages greater than those
awarded in the prior action that the non-common party wishes to use
to estop the common party would be "compelling circumstances
[that] make it appropriate that the [common] party be permitted to
relitigate the issue."' 49
C. Progressively Limiting a Plaintiff's Damages to a Percentage
of the Immediately Preceding Plaintiffs Damages
The third proposed limit on damages that could be recovered by
a plaintiff who relies upon nonmutual collateral estoppel would limit
the damages available to a percentage-less than 100 percent-of the
damages recovered in the original action or in the most recent action
in which a plaintiff employed nonmutual collateral estoppel to estab-
lish an element of the cause of action. The amount of damages possi-
ble in each subsequent action in which a plaintiff employs nonmutual
collateral estoppel would diminish. Assuming that in each case the
damages are the maximum possible under this type of limit, the total
amount of damages in a sequence of cases is a geometric series.1
50 It
is of the form
settle a claim by a plaintiff with small damages simply to avoid the danger of an adverse
finding. Even an aberrational finding in a suit involving meager damages could prove
disastrous to the defendant if there is a plaintiff with a significantly larger claim who is
pursuing a "wait and see" tactic. See generally Economic Analysis, supra note 67.
145 But see sources cited supra note 140.
146 This would likely benefit plaintiffs with small claims the most, even though their
leverage in settlements would be reduced. Plaintiffs with small claims, if larger claims are
looming and nonmutual collateral estoppel is available, may face a more vigorous defense
than would otherwise be warranted if nonmutual collateral estoppel was not available; the
plaintiff has a relatively meager amount at stake in the litigation, but the defendant, faced
with the prospect of losses not only in the present suit but also in any future suits, would
have a much greater incentive to litigate against even a claim seeking meager damages.
147 See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OFJUDGMENTs § 29 cmt. b (1982) ("What combination of circumstances justifies
withholding preclusion is a matter of sound descretion [sic], guided by the general princi-
ple that a party should not be precluded unless his previous opportunity was at least the
equivalent of that otherwise awaiting him in the present litigation.").
148 See supra Part V.A.
149 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJJDGMENTS § 29(8) (1982).
150 See WILLIAM E. BOYCE & RiCHARD C. DiPPawA, CALCULUS 592 (1988).
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00
k=O
Expanded, this series appears as
00
I r k = + r + r 2 + r3 + ... + rk +...15
k=O
For positive values of r that are less than 1, this series will converge to
Equation Three
152
(1-r)
In this instance, r is the percentage limit on the damages recovered in
the original action, and this limit, by definition, sets that percentage
to less than 100 percent (i.e., r is less than 1.00).
The total amount of damages for which a defendant might possi-
bly become liable as a result of any one suit can therefore be pre-
dicted. Of course, the damages awarded in the first suit are still
difficult to predict, but they are far more susceptible to accurate esti-
mation than the total amount of potential damages in any future liti-
gation brought by other plaintiffs.' 53 Facilitating prediction of
possible damages, some jurisdictions limit a plaintiff's recovery to the
damages demanded in the complaint.'5 4
To illustrate, the following table describes the cumulative total
amount of damages that a defendant might face as a result of an ad-
verse finding:
TABLE ONE
Percentage Possible Cumulative Total Amount of Damages
50% 2 Times Original
75% 4 Times Original
90% 10 Times Original
95% 20 Times Original
151 Id. at 592 eq.13.
152 Id. at 592 eq.17.
153 This is especially true when future plaintiffs are unforeseen.
154 See, e.g., Town & Country Props., Inc. v. Riggins, 457 S.E.2d 356, 365 (Va. 1995).
But see, e.g., FED. R. Ctv. P. 54(c) ("Every other final judgment [except a default judgment]
should grant the relief to which each party is entitled, even if the party has not demanded
that relief in its pleadings."); Breland v. Ford, 693 So. 2d 393, 397 (Ala. 1997) ("[A] litigant
seeking general damages for personal injuries .... may recover an amount in excess of the
amount contained in the ad damnum clause of the complaint."); cf, e.g., Savago v. Payne,
566 N.Y.S.2d 677, 679 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (allowing amendment of the complaint after
trial because "the bill of particulars sought 'remuneration for such other damages as the
plaintiffs shall prove upon the trial of the action herein."').
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The values in the above table are the result of simply applying the
percentage limits in the convergence equation 155 to determine the
values to which the geometric series converges. 156
This scheme, depending on where the percentage limit is set,
may provide a severe disincentive to plaintiffs who might otherwise
rely on nonmutual collateral estoppel. Of course, plaintiffs facing
such a limit may opt to not employ nonmutual issue preclusion 57;
forgoing preclusion woulu allow plaintiffs to receive more in damages
than would be available as a result of this type of limit. Because a
significant number of plaintiffs may forgo asserting estoppel, this type
of system may sharply reduce or eliminate the efficiency gains that
nonmutuality of issue preclusion is supposed to provide.
The principal drawback of this system is its complexity. Although
the arithmetic is fairly simple, questions about which action is most
recent may prove problematic. Would filing date be controlling?
Date of judgment? Would defendants have to assert the cap as a de-
fense? Who would bear the burden of proof? Each of these questions
can be answered, but even once these issues are resolved, tracking
multiple litigations and proving that the issue to be precluded was
decided or precluded in each of them might be administratively bur-
densome and give rise to additional litigation.
D. Comparisons of These Methods
The following chart describes the defendant's potential liability
to an individual plaintiff as these damages would be limited under the
155 See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
156 For example, for a percentage limit of 75%, r is 0.75. Incorporating this value in
the convergence equation yields
1 1I
- =-4(1-0.75) (0.25)
The geometric series appears as
0.75' = 1 + 0.75 + 0.752 + 0.75' + ... + 0.75' +
k--0
The first element in this series, the value of 1, represents the award in the first suit, on
which later plaintiffs asserting nonmutual collateral estoppel will attempt to rely. The sec-
ond value in the series, the value of 0.75 (or 75%), represents the damages sought by (and
presumably awarded to) the first plaintiff to rely on nonmutual collateral estoppel. The
third value in the series, 0.75 to the second power (equal to 0.5625, or 56.25%), represents
the damages sought by (and presumably awarded to) the second pla"ntiff to rely on non-
mutual collateral estoppel. This sequence of diminishing potential awards will continue
for all successive plaintiffs who rely on nonmutual collateral estoppel.
157 Even when nonmutual issue preclusion is available, a plaintiff may instead choose
to prove the element of the cause of action. For example, plaintiffs might choose to offer
proof of an element rather than assert estoppel when the proof is prejudicial to the defen-
dant; this will be especially true when an issue is the amount of damages resulting from
egregious conduct by the defendant. Cf supra note 141.
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second proposed regime 58 (i.e., where damages available to a plain-
tiff relying on nonmutual collateral estoppel are limited to the dam-
ages awarded in the original action) and under two variations of the
third proposed regime t59 (i.e., where damages available to a plaintiff
relying on nonmutual collateral estoppel are limited to a percentage
of the damages awarded in the origiiial action or the most recent suit
in which a plaintiff relied on nonmutual collateral estoppel). Plaintiff
number one is the first successful plaintiff, and plaintiffs two through
fifty are successive plaintiffs who rely on nonmutual collateral estop-
pel. Damages are expressed as a percentage of the damages recov-
ered in the original action.
CHART ONE
100%_
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Limit to Original
Damages
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--- 50% Limit
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Plaintiff
Chart: Defendant's Potential Liability to Individual Plaintiffs
(expressed as a percentage of the damages recovered by the original plaintiff)
Under the regime in which the damages are limited to those in the
original action, the common defendant would face liability to each
subsequent plaintiff of up to the amount of the damages in the origi-
nal action, but no more. Under the regime in which damages sought
by a plaintiff relying on nonmutual collateral estoppel are limited to a
percentage of the damages recovered in the original action on which
the plaintiff relies or the most recent action in which a plaintiff em-
ployed nonmutual collateral estoppel, and that limit is set to 50 per-
cent, then the common defendant's potential liability to successive
158 See supra Part IV.B.
159 See supra Part IV.C.
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plaintiffs rapidly declines. For example, the defendant's potential lia-
bility to the first plaintiff to rely on nonmutual collateral estoppel
would be limited to 50 percent of the damages in the original action;
potential liability to the second plaintiff to rely on nonmutual collat-
eral estoppel would be limited to 25 percent of those in the original
action; potential liability to the seventh subsequent plaintiff would be
less than 1 percent. Under the same type of scheme, but with the
damages limited to 95 percent of those in the most recent action, the
defendant's potential liability to the first plaintiff to rely on non-
mutual collateral estoppel would be limited to 95 percent of the dam-
ages in the original action; potential liability to the second plaintiff to
rely on nonmutual collateral estoppel would be limited to approxi-
mately 90 percent of those in the original action; potential liability to
the seventh subsequent plaintiff would be about 70 percent; potential
liability to the fiftieth plaintiff would be limited to about 8 percent of
the damages recovered by the first victorious plaintiff.
Perhaps more telling is the following chart, which shows the total
potential liability of a common defendant faced with multiple poten-
tial plaintiffs under the second and third schemes. The defendant's
total potential liability is a function of the number of potential plain-
tiffs (who would follow the first successful plaintiff). This potential
liability is described as a multiple of the award in the first suit in which
the defendant loses:
CHART Two
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Chart: Extent of Defendant's Potential Liability Resulting from an Adverse Finding as a
Function of the Number of Potential Plaintiffs
(expressed as a multiple of defendant's obligation to the original plaintiff)
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As one can see from this chart, for a defendant facing plaintiffs who
would rely on nonmutual collateral estoppel, total potential liability
resulting from an adverse finding would be limited, under the second
scheme, to the original damages multiplied by the number of plain-
tiffs who rely on nonmutual collateral estoppel (plus the damages
awarded to the first successful plaintiff). Where the subsequent plain-
tiffs who rely on nonmutual collateral estoppel have damages limited
to a percentage (less than 100 percent), the defendant's potential lia-
bility resulting from an adverse finding is lower, and it is limited, no
matter how many potential plaintiffs there are.
Even when one of these limits is in place, a defendant's total po-
tential liability could vary widely based on the type of limit in place
and the number of potential plaintiffs. Consider a hypothetical situa-
tion in which fifty plaintiffs are injured in the same accident, and they
sue one at a time. If the defendant loses the first suit, under a scheme
that limits damages possible for a plaintiff who relies on nonmutual
collateral estoppel to the damages won by the plaintiff on whose suit
the subsequent plaintiff relies to estop the common defendant, the
defendant would face a cumulative total potential damages of fifty
times the damages in the first suit. Under the same scheme, if the
defendant won the first twenty-five suits but lost the twenty-sixth, the
defendant would face a potential liability of twenty-five times the dam-
ages won by the twenty-sixth plaintiff. Under a 50-percent limit, the
defendant who lost the twenty-sixth suit would face a total potential
liability of approximately two times the damages awarded to that suc-
cessful plaintiff. Under the 95-percent limit, the defendant who lost
the twenty-sixth suit would face a total potential liability of approxi-
mately fourteen times the damages awarded to that successful
plain-if
CONCLUSION
Any of the proposed limits on damages would, in appropriate
cases, continue to provide the efficiency advantages that result from
nonmutual collateral estoppel. However, they would, to varying de-
grees, reduce or eliminate the fairness problems that arise with offen-
sive nonmutual collateral estoppel. This would be especially true
when a court implements one of the proposed damage limitations in
conjunction with any of the other reforms described in Part III.B.
None of these schemes would limit the discretion of the trial judge to
ensure that offensive nonmutual collateral estoppel does not give rise
to fairness problems; instead, they each would supplement the trial
judge's decision making and leave the judge free to disallow non-
mutual collateral estoppel should the circumstances warrant. By pro-
viding greater predictability of the future effects of litigation, these
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limits would increase a defendant's ability to correctly discern the
level of vigor with which to litigate a suit. They would also reduce the
effects of unfair results when a series of suits by different plaintiffs
results in inconsistent findings; a plaintiff might still rely on a sole
finding against the defendant, but only to a more limited extent. Fur-
ther, they would limit or eliminate surprise damages in suits by un-
foreseen plaintiffs. Moreover, these limits may even increase judicial
efficiency; by reducing or eliminating the incentive for plaintiffs to
"wait and see" what happens in suits brought by other plaintiffs, they
might make plaintiffs more likely to combine their separate claims in
a single suit.
The preferred method would likely be to limit damages recover-
able in a suit in which the plaintiff relies on offensive nonmutual issue
preclusion to establish an element of the cause of action to the dam-
ages in the original suit. Such a per se rule would enable a defendant
facing multiple plaintiffs to foresee the scope of its potential liability-
thereby limiting the worst of the unfair effects of nonmutual issue pre-
clusion. Although the "converging geometric series" method provides
the greatest amount of certainty for a defendant about the potential
liability that might arise from given litigation, that method is likely too
complex to be workable. A flat statutory cap on damages would, be-
cause of its simplicity, be preferable, but it lacks flexibility, and there
are potential problems with setting the limit too high to be effective or
too low to permit efficiency gains to result.
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